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STAFF NOTES:

Middle East Africa South Asia

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MIDDLE EAST – AFRICA – SOUTH ASIA

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Tanzania

New Military Appointments

President Julius Nyerere announced on July 10
1 a number of personnel changes in the military,
including the removal of both the chief of staff
and the political education officer of the Tanzanian
Peoples Defense Forces (TPDF). These shifts appear
3 designed to improve the efficiency and morale of the
forces and to further tighten civilian control over
them.

Brigadier Simon Nkwera, who was removed as chief
1 of staff--the number two uniformed military post--
was shunted-off to an insignificant civilian job.
Nyerere probably took this action because of friction
2 between Nkwera and Major General Abdallah Twalipo,
the commander of the TPDF, and because auditors'
reports indicated that Nkwera has been involved in
the misuse of funds and other forms of corruption.
The new chief of staff is Brigadier Kiwelu, a young
1 and professionally competent officer.

Twalipo, who has headed the TPDF since early
1974, is a former non-commissioned officer with only
3 a grade school education. He appears not to be up
to running the army, but is kept on by Nyerere who
perceives him to be no threat to civilian supremacy.

Nyerere may have named Kiwelu as chief of staff
in part to placate armed forces personnel from north-
ern tribes, especially Chaggas. The northerners
were angered by the removal of northern officers
from all top jobs during the widespread military
shifts made by Nyerere in early 1974 as a result of
25X1C [redacted] reports indicating that north-
ern officers were engaged in coup plotting. Kiwelu
is a member of the Chagga tribe, one of the most
dynamic and cohesive groups in Tanzania, and one
which has traditionally been strongly represented
in the TPDF.

(Continued)

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
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3 In addition to shuffling high ranking officers, Nyerere took the unusual step of appointing a civilian, Moses Nnauye, to be chief of political education for the TPDF. Nnauye's whole career has been as a civilian official of the ruling political party, the Tanganyika African National Union. He is now taking military training and will probably be given high military rank. Political indoctrination for TPDF members has been given high priority since the army mutiny of 1964; usually it has been handled by military officers.

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Pakistan

Soviets Hint at Arms Aid

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25X1C

This is the second time in recent months that the Pakistanis have alleged that Moscow has hinted at the possibility of renewed Soviet military assistance to Pakistan.

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The Soviets objected strongly to the US decision in February to resume arms sales to the subcontinent, but they may have subsequently concluded that the carrot would produce better results than the stick.

In all probability, renewed Soviet arms aid to Pakistan would not amount to much either quantitatively or qualitatively; it would be aimed mainly at preventing the US from fully capitalizing on its new arms supply policy in Pakistan and perhaps also at discouraging the Pakistanis from supporting the US naval presence in the Indian Ocean. No decision on renewed Soviet arms aid for Pakistan will be taken without due consideration of its likely impact on Soviet-Indian relations. Even a token Soviet agreement with Pakistan would bother the Indians. The Soviets may calculate, however, that given the size of the military aid agreement Moscow concluded with India last February--the largest ever between the two countries--and the state of India's relations with both China and the US, the USSR can live with a degree of Indian discomfiture. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)

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India

Satellite Instructional Television Experiment

India is initiating, with US help, an experimental instructional program using satellites. New Delhi, which is engaged in a long range program to educate the masses through the medium of television, hopes that satellites and inexpensive earth stations can substitute for more costly terrestrial networks.

Under an agreement between India's Department of Atomic Energy and the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration, India will lease NASA's applications technology satellite for one year beginning in August. The Indians will have use of the satellite for four hours each day with NASA providing technical assistance as needed. India will be responsible for procurement, production, and maintenance of all hardware (earth stations, TV transmitters, receivers, etc.) and software (program material in 14 languages on agriculture, handicrafts, family planning, and hygiene). The overall cost of the experiment is estimated at \$11.5 million.

The experiment is unique because it is the first to broadcast TV programs directly from a satellite to augmented conventional TV receivers. The augmentation is in the form of small chicken-wire antennas, preamplifiers, and converters. Each receiver will cost only about \$500 each, compared with costs running into the millions for large earth stations and associated cable and microwave distribution systems. Eventually about 2,400 villages will be equipped with the augmented TV receivers.

The project is possible only by using NASA's satellite, which has an extremely powerful onboard transmitter and a large, narrow focus antenna that permits small, inexpensive receivers on earth to receive the signal. As a follow-on to the present experiment, India plans to build its own communications satellite to reach over 500,000 TV receivers by 1980. New Delhi will probably ask the USSR to provide the necessary launch services. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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